Utilising Norwegian linked employer-employee register data for 2002-2004 while exploiting a discontinuity in public sick pay legislation, I show that the sick pay level causally affects workers' sickness absence days, but only under certain performance pay schemes. Workers respond to public incentives under piece-rate contracts and to a certain degree, under surplus sharing schemes, but not under provision pay, stocks, stock options, individualised bonuses nor team bonuses. Reducing the public sick-pay replacement rate has thus a differential impact on workers' absence rates depending on pay and compensation regimes, which impairs its effectiveness as an absence-reducing device.
Introduction
In many redistributive economies, such as Norway, absenteeism is expensive measured by the direct cost 1 , and even more so if one takes into account the indirect production disruption costs.
Most empirical evidence clearly indicates that incentives matters for absenteeism, regardless whether they are publicly or privately provided (Barmby et al., 1995; Johansson and Palme, 1996; Johansson and Palme, 2002; Henrekson and Persson, 2004) . For example, Johansson and Palme, (2002) utilise joint changes in the Swedish tax system over time in a country (which provides variation in the price of leisure) and sick pay cuts, to show that as the cost absenteeism increases for the workers, absenteeism drops. Thus, by cutting wages whenever a worker is absent, the absence rate drops.
However, when the public sick pay legislation is supplemented by additional privately funded sick pay, this may severely limit the effect of public sick pay reforms. Cut in the public sick pay might potentially be offset by the private sick compensation, which firms provide to attract and to retain valuable workers. Furthermore, the presence of performance pay and incentive-related remuneration may interact with the public sick pay legislation, thus influencing the absenteeism of workers. Empirically several studies identify reduced sickness absence associated with firm-provided financial incentives (Barmby et al., 1995; Brown et al., 1999; DaleOlsen, 2011) . The mechanism which ensures that performance pay affects sickness absence is, however, less obvious. Performance pay and financial incentives may act as a motivational device.
That financial incentives may act as motivational devices is seen clearly in Hassink and Koning 1 According to Norway's National Budget 2010 publicly paid sick pay constitute 1.5 per cent of GDP (http://www.statsbudsjettet.dep.no/upload/Statsbudsjett_2010/dokumenter/pdf/summary_national%20_budget_2 010.pdf) (or 37.5 billion Nok), in addition comes the privately paid sick pay. Even in the UK, with less generous sick pay systems, it has been estimated that the direct cost of absence to the UK economy in 2003 was £11.6 billion (Barham and Begum, 2005) .
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(2009) and Engellandt and Riphahn (2011) , where the expected pay-off for workers is negligible but still invoke a significant response. From fairness and responsibility perspectives (Rotemberg, 2006; Cappelen et al., 2010) , certain performance pay schemes can influence workers absence behaviour since each worker's behaviour might influence the pay-off of co-workers. However, performance pay might also be a device that aligns the cost of absenteeism between employers and workers. This could be directly related to the pay involved, but it might also be related to increased awareness of the costs of absenteeism and the following consequences or selection of workers sharing such efficiency concerns.
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In this paper I exploit a discontinuity in the Norwegian public sick pay legislation to identify the causal impact of changes in the sick pay compensation on workers' number of sickness absence days. In Norway publicly provided sick pay is capped at a level called 6G, where G expresses the National Social Service baseline figure (in 2004 around 4711£/8625$), which is adjusted May 1st each year. 45 per cent of all private sector Norwegian full-time workers receive pay above this limit. If only publicly provided sick pay existed, one should be able to identify a causal impact of sick pay on absence by just comparing the absence behaviour of workers earning just below and just above this threshold. This strategy would follow from a regressiondiscontinuity approach, which has been successfully been shown to reveal causal relationships requiring mild assumptions (Hahn et al., 2001; Nichols, 2007; Lee and Lemieux, 2009) compared to for example the IV-approach. To justify the exclusion restrictions in an IV-approach can sometimes be very hard. In my case, a RD-approach adds further benefits, since the location just below or just above the earnings threshold and the relationship to sickness absence can hardly be related to motivation, fairness or responsibility perspectives, or to the issue of cost alignment 4 between employers and workers. The RD-approach would thus highlight one mechanism; the incentive effect associated with the public sick pay legislation.
When employers provide additional sick pay as well, as is seen in other welfare countries as well (Barmby et al., 2002) , this strategy needs additional information to be successful. Since a considerable number of the private sector employers provide additional sick pay this might occlude the sharp distinction between being just above or just below the sick pay threshold.
However, by utilising Norwegian employer-employee register data for 2002-2004 linked to workplace questionnaire data information on privately provided sick pay as well as on remuneration schemes, I am able analyse how the sick pay threshold affects workers' sickness absence days under two different sick pay regimes and under different remuneration schemes.
This allows me to shed light on the causal impact of public sick pay on absenteeism.
It is easy to assume that a causal impact of public sick pay on absenteeism should be most visible under a fixed pay regime with public sick pay only, where the number of sick days should drop when sick pay during sick leaves are no longer fully compensated. However, sick pay is only capped at 6G, it does not drop to zero, thus if wages are continuously distributed around the threshold 6G, we might not observe a big drop in absenteeism at 6G. We argue that performance pay may act as an enforcer of such a mechanism, by making the loss caused by absenteeism greater.
On the other hand, when the public sick pay is supplemented by private sick pay, it is reasonable to expect that no clear relationship will be observed. This is easily seen by considering the following cases. By choosing an absence level, a, when facing imperfect monitoring, N identical workers maximise expected utility. Let the monitoring probability be 0<m<1. An absent and monitored worker is fired. Each worker maximises:
where U denotes theVon Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, W is the current wage, S is sick pay, R is the outside options, C expresses the cost of effort as a convex function of absence (C'>0, C''>0). The first order condition is then given by:
i. e., workers chooses their absence level so marginal benefits equal marginal costs of providing effort. When private sick pay supplements public sick pay workers are more likely to be fully covered, and thus only the monitoring intensity determines the absence level. It is hard to argue that this will differ markedly just below and just above 6G. When only public sick pay is provided, the absence levels will increasingly drop as earnings pass the 6G-limit. If sick pay only covers fixed pay and bonuses are increasing with the pay levels, then we should observe a stronger drop at 6G under performance pay than under fixed pay.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the sick pay legislation and compensation system in Norway. Section 3 presents the regression-discontinuity 
The Norwegian sick pay legislation
The public sick pay system in Norway is prototypical of a generous Scandinavian welfare state.
Workers on fixed pay contracts are provided "complete" compensation for 1 year if their salaries are less than 6G (G=baseline level public social insurance system, increasing from 51 360 NOK Finally, each worker may be absent up to 4 periods of days during a 12 month period based on an own declaration of illness. All absences lasting at least 4 days have to be physiciancertified (in which case the first 3 days are registered in the absence spell) and for those workers experiencing more than 4 spells during the last 12 months, all absences regardless of duration have to be physician-certified. Statistics Norway estimates that self-certified absences constitute one fifth of the physician-certified absence rates in 2008. As is described in the data section, my data comprise information on male workers 20-60 years of age, but only physician-certified absences are registered. Thus we cannot differentiate between workers with no sickness absences and those with absences based on self-declarations.
8 3. The empirical strategy -a regression-discontinuity approach.
In a RD design one exploits an observable discontinuity in the level of treatment related to an assignment variable, i.e., the level of treatment jumps discontinuously at some specific value or threshold. This value is often called the cutoff. In my case, under public sick pay only, the treatment variable -sick pay providing complete compensation -rises continuously with earnings, until it reaches the earnings level 6G -the cutoff or threshold -and then stay fixed at 6G. Thus albeit we do not observe directly a discontinuous drop in sick pay, complete compensation as the treatment variable experiences a drop from one to zero at 6G. In the neighbourhood of 6G complete compensation can be treated as randomly assigned. I do not argue that individuals are unable to manipulate earnings, however, a worker is seldom completely able to individually determine his or her earnings. Complete manipulation, on the other hand, will usually be associated with such problems.
In the RD-design one estimates the size of a discontinuous jump in variables by comparing the means of small bins on both sides of the cutoff, or by estimating regressions comprising various polynomials around the cutoff, a dummy for being above the cutoff and interactions. While Nichols (2007: 528) argues that "the goal is to compute an effect at precisely one point using only the closest observations", thus advocating the use of local linear regression since this arguably minimize bias (Fan and Gijbels, 1996) . On the other hand, Lee and Lemieux (2009) point out that both non-parametric and parametric estimation are associated with bias, and 9 without knowing the true underlying function it is impossible to know which case has the smaller bias, thus emphasizing that non-parametric and parametric estimations are complements.
In this paper I have decided to primarily use non-parametric estimation, i.e., local linear regressions. Thus I have to resolve the issues related to the choices of bandwidth and kernels.
Nichols (2007) Lee and Lemieux (2009) and Nichols (2007) and repeat the analyses using bandwidths of half the size and twice the size of the default bandwidth.
The data
The first data set comprises a questionnaires, the Norwegian Workplace and Employment
Relationship Survey 2003 (NWERS2003), answered winter 2003 by the daily manager or personnel manager of roughly 2300 Norwegian workplaces from public and private sectors. These establishments are sampled from the population of workplaces with more than 10 employees (roughly 35000 workplaces). The NWERS-workplaces employ over 350 000 workers, i.e., nearly a fifth of the Norwegian workforce. The sampling procedure and the questionnaires (NWERS2003 only) are described in Holth (2003) . The questionnaires cover topics such as compensation, work practices and organisation issues, and are similar to questionnaires found in many countries (for example, WERS in the United Kingdom).
The second data set, or more precisely, data system, is based on public administrative register data comprising all firms, workplaces and employees (incl. Let us return briefly to the key measures. The number of sickness absence days is measured as the number of physician-certified absence days during a year (aggregated over all spells within a year), thus it is not related to how the sick pay is financed. Thus our absence measure comprises short and long-term absences (in most cases, at least 4 days). Thus data do not comprise self-certified absences. Although self-declared sick leaves seem more strongly related to shirking behaviour, physician-certified absences will also contain such, since as in the other Scandinavian countries, Norwegian physicians seldom deny sickness certificates (Wahlström and 11 Alexanderson, 2004; Carlsen and Nyborg, 2009 ), thus leaving considerable scope for worker discretion regarding absence.
Our earnings measure is based on total earnings reported to the tax authorities, defined as W. This measure comprises all wages, sick pay and taxable fringe benefits (such as a company car, stocks and stock options) received in a specific job during the year. We transform the earnings measure so it is centralised around 6G, i.e., LnE=ln(W)-ln(G6).
From the questionnaire, the questions regarding employer provided sick pay, worker pay compensation and determination are particularly relevant. The questionnaires provides information on whether workers' wages are performance related (explicitly differentiating between surplus or profit sharing regime, individual-and group piece-rate, commissions, group bonuses, individual bonuses, stocks or stock options), or if they are fixed.
As an introduction to the empirical analyses that follow in the next section we end this section with a brief overview of the data in the form of descriptive statistics. In column 1 and 4 of Table 2 we present averages (and standard deviations) of the 2004-sample of male workers employed under public sick pay only and public and private sick pay combined, respectively. We see that workers employed under public sick pay only are slightly more absent, they receive slightly less pay and have educations of shorter durations compared to workers employed under public and private sick pay combined. When it comes to other personal characteristics such as seniority, experience, age, and being fulltime worker the difference is negligible.
[ Table 2 around here ]
However, we see clear differences when it comes to pay regimes. Workers employed under public sick pay receive fixed pay more often than the other group (35.7 per cent vs. 21.9 per cent).
Conditional on receiving performance pay we see that piece-rate is more common among workers 12 receiving public sick pay only, while individual bonuses as well as stocks are more common among those receiving both public and private sick pay. Table 2 also presents descriptive statistics on the sample when discarding observations considered to outside a chosen bandwidth around the threshold and the discontinuity. In the table the chosen bandwidth is the default bandwidth reported in Models 1 and 4 in Table 3 . From a RD-perspective predetermined characteristics should not exhibit a discontinuity at the cutoff of 6G. Thus we would be worried if the descriptive statistics just below or just above the cutoff differed drastically. Table 2 shows that for most variables these are quite similar. The exceptions are of course, related to the number of absence days and earnings, but since they express outcome and assignment variables they are not important in this respect. However, we also see that pay schemes differs when comparing workers just below and just above the cutoff. More workers are employed under fixed pay contracts just below the cutoff than just above the cutoff, while the opposite is true for performance pay. Group bonuses, stocks and piece-rates are more common just above the threshold than just below.
Empirical results
In this section we then turn to our main question: the relationship between the number of absence days and sick pay around the earnings threshold of 6G. Figures 1-3 and Table 3 present the main results from the RD-analysis. Models 1 -3 report the results for workplaces where employees only receive public sick pay, while models 4 -6 report the results for workplaces where employers provide sick pay in addition to the publicly provided. The results from separate analyses for performance pay workplaces only are reported in models 2 and 5, while the similar results for fixed pay workplaces are reported in models 3 and 6.
[ Table 3 around here ]
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The results for Table 3 are striking. When only public sick is provided, we observe a drop of 2.9 days at the discontinuity, but this is really related to performance pay workplaces. No significant RD-effect is found for fixed pay workplaces, but for performance pay workplaces the number of sick days drops by 5 days at the discontinuity. When additional private sick is provided, the estimates are clearly weaker and not statistically significant. These latter results are as expected since the provision of additional private sick pay disrupts the discontinuity at 6G, i.
e., we should not expect to observe strong RD-effects for these workplaces and their employees.
These baseline estimates are based on default bandwidths calculated using the method of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) . To test how robust our results are to the choices of bandwidth we repeat the analyses using bandwidth half or twice the size of the default bandwidth. We see that for performance pay workplaces under public sick pay the RD-effect is still significant and only drops slightly. In these cases the number of sick days drops by 4 days at the discontinuity. In no other cases we find significant results.
For an RD-design to be valid certain assumptions have to be satisfied. First, we clearly would prefer that no discontinuities of the assignment variable existed around the cutoff. To shed light on this, in Figure A3 and Figure A4 we present kernel densities of the assignment variable around the cutoff for our different populations. These figures show that, while clearly most of the densities deviate from the picture of a smooth normal density, they do not reveal strong evidence for discontinuities around the cut-off. Furthermore, to formalise this somewhat, I have followed the methods of McCrary (2008) and tested for each model in Table 3 whether we can reject the notion of continuity in the density at the cutoff (based on 100 simulations and two different bandwidth sizes). In no case we can reject this (average t-values in each model ranging from -1.0 to 1.1).
It is the discontinuity of complete compensation at 6G, dropping from 1 to 0, that makes our identification possible. This identification is ensured regardless of how the distributions of 14 earnings and sick pay are elsewhere. However, it is reassuring if we do not discover discontinuous treatment effects elsewhere, since few should really be found (statistically one cannot exclude the possibility of randomly identifying an erroneous cut-off). To test this, I have randomly assigned 100 placebo cutoff points (located elsewhere than 6G), and repeated my analysis. In each case I identify 8-10 erroneous cut-offs. The average estimates of these pseudo-RD effects are also presented in Table 3 . As we see, no estimates are significantly different from zero, and in most cases the point estimates are also small. Thus I find few evidences of discontinuous treatment effects elsewhere.
Next, it is desirable that a test of the measured jump in each predetermined potential controls is zero at the cutoff. Otherwise one could worry about non-random sorting around the cutoff. Table A1 Table A2 . The essence of figures is that, albeit being not as strong, they 3 The concerning exceptions are found related to surplus sharing workplaces providing public sick pay only and to the educational qualifications of workers employed by fixed pay workplaces providing sick pay only. Excluding the former workplaces from the analyses does not qualitatively change our conclusion. In the latter case, the culprit is workers having compulsory schooling only. Excluding these workers does not alter the conclusions either.
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do not qualitatively differ from the 2004 results. We have also repeated the analyses excluding long term absences (more than 30 per cent lost work days)(not reported), and while the overall effects become somewhat weaker, the results are qualitatively unchanged.
From my analyses we then can infer two temporary conclusions. First, for workers employed under performance pay the number of sick days drops by 4-5 days when sick pay is no longer completely compensated. On average these workers experience 15 days of sick leave, thus the reduction is considerable. Second, for workers employed under fixed pay contracts no reduction occurs when sick pay is no longer completely compensated. The first conclusion is mildly surprising, but the second result is possibly even more surprising. This latter result implies that at these earnings levels there is no causal impact of the sick pay on sickness absence. Thus the potential public savings from cutting the sick pay is for these workers limited to the reduction in the direct sick pay expenditures per sick day, and not by behavioural changes causing additional saving due to a reduction in the number of sick days.
Why then do workers employed under performance pay reduce their number of sick days when sick pay is no longer fully compensated? To answer this question I repeat the analyses for these workers only, but differentiate between different forms of performance pay. We differentiate between piece rate, group bonus, individual bonus, surplus sharing, commission, stocks, and stock options. Table 4 presents the results from these analyses. Column headings denote the different performance pay schemes.
[ Table 4 around here ]
Once again we see a striking pattern. Most of the performance pay schemes are associated with drops of 1-2 sick days when sick leave is no longer fully compensated, but these drops are not significant. The exceptions are piece rate pay and commission pay, where the number of sick days drop 7.6 -8.5 days when sick leave is no longer fully compensated. Piece rate workers are 16 on average absent due to sickness around 18 days, i. e., once again the reduction in sick days is considerable. For commission pay the estimate is not significant, probably due to a limited number of observations. The implication of these results is that when we observe that workers under performance pay react to cuts in the public sick pay by reducing their number of sickness absence days, these reductions are primarily born by piece rate and commission workers. These pay schemes clearly are among those that's highlight production related performance targets.
Conclusion and Discussion
Both for firms and public authorities is absenteeism costly. Thus to curb absenteeism and thus achieving public expenses on sick pay one suggested solution has been to cut public sick pay.
Such a strategy would hopefully not only reduce the direct sick pay expenditures per sick day but cause behavioural changes, thus inducing additional savings by reducing the total number of sick days. In this paper I have shown this, at least for medium paid workers, is not necessarily true. By exploiting a discontinuity in the Norwegian sick pay legislation at 6G I find that the absence days of workers under fixed pay are not affected by pay no longer being fully compensated. As documented by Barth et al. (2008) fixed pay is quite common in Norway (close to 50 per cent of all private sector employers with more than 10 employees provide fixed pay in 2003). This raises doubt that the behavioural changes following a cut in the sick pay will be as significant as one could desire, at least for medium and high paid workers. On the other hand, one could always argue that a majority of the public sick pay expenses covers absences of relatively low-paid workers. My study is less relevant for this group of workers, thus still leaving considerable scope for cost savings and altered sickness absence behaviour.
However, I do find that piece-rate workers, and to a certain degree commission workers, cut back their sick leave days considerably when sick leave is no longer fully compensated. This 17 begs the question why? We can reject the possibility that what we are seeing here is that illnesses make piece-rate workers lose money, i. e., that we are measuring the impact of not only having sick pay less than fully compensated, but an additional earnings loss as well. We know that piecerate workers are more productive and receive higher earnings than fixed pay earnings (Brown, 1992; Lazear, 2000; Haley, 2003; Pekkarinen and Riddel, 2008) , but not necessarily more profitable (Freeman and Kleiner, 2005) . We can also exclude the possibility that this is related to injuries and compensating wage differentials. 4 The reasons why we can exclude these explanations is that my results followed from within pay scheme analyses, and the analysis of pseudocutoffs did not reveal any other significant cutoff, which we would have expected if the two previous explanations had been correct. Thus this is explicitly related to different worker behaviour around the cutoff at 6G. However, I cannot exclude the possibility that piece-rate workers are, in general and more than other workers, concerned or aware about pay and how their effort influences pay, and thus explicitly adjust their behaviour when facing changed sick pay. 
Note: Number of workplaces and workers in 1000 are presented in parentheses. Proportion of workers in workplaces that earn above the earnings threshold for publicly provided sick pay (above 6G) is denoted in 
